Fraud Management
Last updated 12 Oct 2026
At a glance
Fraud Management detects, scores, decides on and investigates suspicious activity across customers, accounts, devices, SIMs, network traffic and payments. Revenue Assurance looks for our own failures after the fact. Fraud management looks for someone else’s abuse, and must often decide within minutes whether to let activity continue, because the loss grows while it runs.
The picture
Fraud management simulation
Fraud asks whether someone is deliberately abusing the service, account, network or payment system. Revenue assurance asks a different question — whether our own systems lost legitimate revenue.
An attacker moves the victim’s number to a SIM they control, then uses it to pass one-time-code checks elsewhere.
Detect
Decide
Respond
Narration
Twenty minutes after a SIM replacement, the same account sees a password reset, a login from a new device in an unfamiliar city and a high-value handset order on account credit. Each event alone is ordinary; together they are the classic takeover sequence. Press Raise the alert to follow it through detection to a decision — yours.
Alert not yet raised.
Signals vs baseline
Signals appear when the detection engine evaluates the alert.
Investigate the alert
The alert pauses at Decision management. You take the decision.
How it works
A different question from Revenue Assurance
The two share data and are often sold together as “RAFM”, but they work differently. RA reconciles and recovers. Fraud management decides, often in seconds, because much of a fraud loss cannot be recovered afterwards. Its measure of success is fraud loss prevented at an acceptable cost in false positives and customer friction.
From activity to decision
Activity
Network / BSS / channelsCalls, sessions, SMS, SIM changes, logins, orders, top-ups and payments.
Ingestion
Fraud platformUsage from mediation and the OCS, NRTRDE roaming summaries, CRM and order events, payment and SIM events. Real-time feeds for high-velocity fraud, batch for pattern analysis.
Enrichment
Fraud platform / reference dataAccount age, credit class, products held, device history, home location, known-bad number ranges and IMEIs.
Detection
Rules + MLRules (thresholds, velocity, blocklists) catch known patterns quickly and explainably. Machine-learning models find behaviour unusual against the customer’s own baseline and peer groups. Most operators run both.
Scoring
Fraud platformSignals are weighted into a score per account, SIM or transaction. An uncalibrated score that everyone ignores is worse than none.
Decision
Decision rulesPolicy maps score and context to an action. High-confidence, high-value patterns can be automated; the rest go to a person.
Four actions, applied elsewhere
| Action | What it does | Applied in |
|---|---|---|
| Allow | Let the activity continue, and monitor | Fraud platform |
| Challenge | Step-up verification or call-back | CRM / channels |
| Restrict | Bar international or premium destinations, cap spend | OCS / network policy |
| Block | Suspend the SIM, reject the order or payment | OCS / CRM / payment gateway |
The fraud platform decides; it rarely enforces. Every action needs an integration into a system that does.
From alert to learning
- Case management: the alert becomes a case with evidence, owner and status.
- Investigation: an analyst confirms or rejects fraud from the account, device, location, usage, transactions and recent changes.
- Recovery: withhold payments to partners where the agreement allows, dispute with carriers, reverse charges, refer to law enforcement, reinstate genuine customers.
- Improvement: confirmed and rejected cases feed back into rules and models. Without this loop, false positives stay high and new patterns go unseen.
The tensions every control sits between
| Tension | One way | The other way |
|---|---|---|
| False positives vs losses | Lower thresholds catch more fraud, sooner | Every false alert costs analyst time; every wrongly blocked customer costs revenue and trust |
| Friction vs protection | Step-up checks stop takeover and payment fraud | The same checks slow every genuine customer |
| Real-time vs batch | IRSF and SIM-box losses grow by the minute; only real-time feeds (OCS, signalling, NRTRDE) limit them | Real-time is costlier and sees less context; batch finds patterns across weeks |
| Automation vs investigation | Automated blocks act in seconds | An automated block on the wrong customer is an outage the operator caused |
Standards and data
There is no TM Forum Open API for fraud management. Fraud platforms consume usage (TMF635), customer and account (TMF629, TMF666), product inventory (TMF637) and payment (TMF676) data alongside network feeds. Operators share intelligence (high-risk number ranges, new patterns, stolen-device lists) through the GSMA Fraud and Security Group and the Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA).
Who owns what
| Entity | System of Record | System of Engagement | System of Reference | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fraud alert, risk score and case | Fraud management platform | Fraud analyst case workbench | Revenue Assurance, Finance | — |
| Detection rules, models and decision policy | Fraud management platform | — | — | The policy (who may block what, automatically) must be agreed with the business. |
| Barring or spend restriction | OCS / network policy | Fraud platform (requests it) | CRM | The fraud platform decides; the network enforces. |
| Usage and roaming records | Mediation / OCS | — | Fraud management platform | TMF635; NRTRDE for roaming. |
| Customer, account and identity data | CRM / account management | — | Fraud management platform | TMF629, TMF666. Used for enrichment. |
In practice
RA and fraud are often sold together as one “RAFM” suite. The shared data helps. The risk is running fraud at RA’s rhythm: periodic reconciliation where minutes matter.
Automated actions depend on integrations that are easy to leave out of scope: a real-time path to the OCS or network policy to bar destinations, and to CRM to flag accounts. Without them, a high score becomes an email to an analyst. The other gap is the feedback loop. Cases closed without a confirmed or rejected outcome teach the models nothing.
The trade-off
What it solves
A single place to detect, decide on and investigate abuse across network, account and payment data, with actions that stop loss while the activity is running.
What it does not solve
- Our own capture and billing failures, which are Revenue Assurance’s job.
- Losses already committed to the carrier chain before detection.
- Weak identity checks in shops and contact centres, which only process change can fix.
What it adds
- Real-time feeds from the OCS, signalling and payments, with their cost.
- A decision policy the business must own, including who may block a customer automatically.
- False positives that become customer outages and complaints.
- Case outcomes that must be recorded consistently to train rules and models.
Architecture decision
An enterprise account scores high for IRSF at 02:00: international calls jumped from about 10 a day to hundreds in an hour. What should happen automatically?
Block the account
Choose when the destinations are on a high-risk range list and the pattern matches confirmed IRSF, so the loss per hour outweighs a false block.
Restrict international calls only
Choose when the signal is strong but the account carries legitimate domestic traffic you cannot cut overnight.
Challenge and monitor
Choose when the destinations are unusual but not high-cost, and a named contact can confirm quickly.
Breaks if the policy was never agreed with the business. The analyst on nights has no authority to act, and the carrier invoice for the weekend arrives weeks later.
Takeaways
Key Takeaways
- RA asks whether our systems lost revenue; fraud management asks whether someone is abusing us
- The pipeline runs activity, ingestion, enrichment, detection, scoring and decision, then case, investigation, recovery and improvement
- Rules catch known patterns explainably; ML finds unusual behaviour; most operators run both
- The fraud platform decides, but the OCS, network, CRM and payment gateway enforce
- Every control trades fraud loss against false positives and customer friction
Check yourself
Why is a batch feed from mediation not enough for IRSF detection?Show answerHide
IRSF losses grow with every minute the calls run, and the termination charges are owed regardless. Detection hours later means the loss is already committed. Real-time feeds from the OCS or signalling are needed to restrict while it is happening.
The fraud team’s false-positive rate has not improved in a year despite new rules. What is the likely gap?Show answerHide
The feedback loop. If cases are closed without a confirmed or rejected outcome, rules and models never learn which alerts were genuine.
A high-risk score triggers “restrict international calls”. Which system actually applies it?Show answerHide
The OCS or network policy. The fraud platform decides and requests the action; it needs an integration to the enforcing system, or the decision is only a recommendation.